The case for a steadily-increasing federal debt
For every debtor, there’s a creditor; that’s an irrefutable truth of double-entry accounting. So if the United States government is a multi-trillion dollar debtor, who’s the creditor? Who’s collecting all those hundreds of billions in interest payments?
More importantly, if the government bit the bullet and paid down the debt, those creditors would suffer a double-whammy: they’d lose their assets (the Treasury securities they bought), and their interest income from those assets would stop. Would that result in a net financial benefit to all parties involved?
The following present-value analysis might surprise some of your friends. It analyzes three different scenarios: (1) paying off the debt in 30 years; (2) keeping the debt constant; and (3) steadily increasing the debt. This analysis differs from the present value analyses we usually hear about, because it doesn’t just analyze the government’s side of the ledger, it includes the creditors’ side of the ledger, too. Double-entry accounting dictates that when the government reduces a liability by buying back one of its Treasury securities from a public owner, it also reduces an asset on that owner’s balance sheet. Similarly, when the government increases its liability by selling a Treasury security to a public owner, it increases the assets on that owner’s balance sheet. This present value analysis looks at both sides of the ledger.
Here is a summary of the results. In a nutshell, when government financial effects are netted against private sector financial effects, the net present value of all three scenarios is zero.
Not only do the two sides cancel each other out within each scenario, but (surprise, surprise) the net present value of steadily increasing the government’s debt by 5% per year for 30 years (Case 3) is the net-present-value equivalent of completely paying off the debt in 30 years (Case 1). Before firing off that nasty email to me, click on the thumbnails below, showing the NPV analysis details for each of the three cases.
Click on Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3, in that order:
Note that it doesn’t make any difference to the net present value whether we pay the debt off by running surpluses, versus holding it steady by balancing the dollar budget, versus increasing it continuously by running permanent deficits. The public is happy to receive those interest payments from the government, and is happy to own Treasury securities—so what sense does it make to eliminate those Treasury securities, thereby decreasing the public’s net financial wealth? Why not continue running permanent deficits, using the proceeds from the sale of new Treasury securities to enhance our national security (intelligence, diplomacy, military force potential, and homeland security)? Paying the interest on that debt without ever paying any principal is the net-present-value equivalent of paying off the principal to avoid future interest payments—so what’s the big problem with paying “interest on the debt”? What’s wrong with running permanent deficits?
In fact, some will look at Case 3 and say “Hey, does that imply there’s no limit to the amount of debt we could run up, because the NPV is always a wash?” Well, technically, that’s what the math is saying, but it seems to me there has to be a tipping point somewhere—i.e., the point at which the bond-buying public says, “Wait a minute, that’s a bit too much you’re running up there; I’m going to need a few hundred more basis points before I’ll buy any more Treasury securities.”
But the good news is, it is also apparent that we are nowhere near that tipping point. Inflation and interest rates are nowhere near hyper-levels; if we concentrate on growing the economy while simultaneously limiting the debt-to-GDP ratio to the range it’s in today, the tipping point (if there is one) will remain the undetectable supposition it is today.
Besides, one other thing I like about permanent deficits is knowing that foreigners, including some of our OPEC friends, by purchasing Treasury bonds, are helping us pay for better, more effective methods of protecting ourselves against terrorists. In other words, we’re leveraging “other people’s money” to help fund our nation’s growth rate and national security measures, similar to the way astute private sector corporations use other people’s money to help fund their own growth strategies.
Bottom line: What’s wrong with permanent deficits and permanently growing debt? Nothing, as long as we grow the economy enough to hold the debt-to-GDP ratio approximately constant. The government’s debt is a private sector asset. Let’s grow it instead of shrinking it.

For every borrower there must be a lender. The public deficit is the private sector’s surplus. When the government runs a deficit, it is giving the private sector, by its spending, more than it is taking away in taxes. It is hence adding to the private sector’s disposable income—what it has available for consumption expenditures.
If the unified budget moves into balance or surplus by December 2009, I’ll win an extra thousand dollars worth of the national debt (i.e., Treasury securities), which I will subsequently transfer to my granddaughter. She’ll like that a lot, and she has a great smile; it will be worth every penny. 


Productivity of every kind can be increased by specialization. And the specialization of politics at least keeps politicians from running businesses where their stupidity and ignorance could do even greater harm to economic growth.
Based on my daily sampling of the headlines, I’m convinced that one of the top two most misunderstood aspects of our fiscal budget is “interest on the debt” (…the other being the nature of the debt principal itself). 

The Debt Clock at the upper right of this weblog was long overdue for an upgrade. It now shows “Publicly-held Debt” in addition to the total debt. Note that the ratio of public debt to GDP is ticking backward. [If you don't see the new numbers, try hitting your browser's refresh button.]